Through the nonsensical miasma of illogical, ahistorical, untrue and self-contradictory utterances by the American president and his administration about their war on Iran, each one more ridiculous than the last, a few things are starting to stand out with some degree of clarity. They are pointers of a kind to today, tomorrow and after that. This post and the next couple take a look at a few of them. This one focuses on the US build-up, the search for a way out, and the Strait of Hormuz. It’s not comprehensive in any way, just what I can figure out at the moment.

US forces’ build-up

The rule of thumb is that a big build-up of military forces tends to mean war is coming – or escalation when there already is war. Examples to illustrate the point are the US and allies building up forces in the Gulf in 1990-91, and again in 2002-03, and Russian forces on Ukraine’s borders in 2021. Once they’ve been deployed, there’s always a temptation to use them.

So the current increase in deployed US forces in the Gulf is concerning. News reports are not clear but it looks like 5,000 Marines, more than a thousand paratroops and 2,500 sailors have been sent. The despatch of another 10,000 soldiers is under discussion (if not already decided). It could mean escalation is on the way. Particularly significant to my mind are reports of the A-10 Warthog being deployed. This is an aircraft used to support ground troops, firing shells with depleted uranium casings from a kind of Gatling gun; its seven revolving barrels fire 3,900 armour-piercing rounds per minute and it is immensely effective.

BUT the US isn’t there yet. A US regional force that is normally 40,000 personnel has been increased to around 50,000 and looks like it’s going up to 60,000. By contrast, in 2003, US and coalition forces numbered 250,000 before they attacked. For comparison, Iran’s armed forces are about 610,000 strong (around 350,000 in the army) plus 350,000 active reserves and paramilitary personnel.

The American numbers look like they are contemplating special operations – lightning raids to grab this or destroy that. But these are not the numbers needed for a full-scale invasion and ground war followed by occupation of a country that is almost three times the size of France, with rugged mountain ranges covering half the territory, and has a population of 92 million. That doesn’t mean we should all breathe a sigh of relief. These numbers don’t mean the end of the war is imminent but perhaps they do mean the Gulf region might well be spared the worst.

The numbers also show that, whatever Trump says about already having achieved regime change – twice – regime change is not part of the military mission. The only way it can be achieved is by fomenting a prolonged and probably ethnically defined civil war – an uprising of the Iranian Kurds as Israel’s Netanyahu (like his predecessors) has long urged. That would probably be as destructive and full of tragedy as a full scale US invasion but, for the USA, less costly.

The elusive off-ramp

Israel and the US have lost the initiative in this war. They can do an enormous amount of damage and the Iranian death toll will rise but it won’t give them the initiative or let them decide when to end the war.

Almost as soon as the war started and despite the decapitation strike that killed much of the country’s senior leadership on the first day, Iran responded by not only attacking Israel and US bases in the region, which was predictable (and predicted), but also attacking civilian and economic targets among its regional neighbours. This has caused fury and consternation in the region and surprised many (including Trump) but scenario exercises and war-games have emphasised the probability of that kind of Iranian response to a major attack, along with action against shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Trump was reportedly warned about Iran escalating in this way so maybe he just forgot. Or wasn’t paying attention.

This escalation of the war by Iran seems odd to many observers because of the shadow it will leave after the war, hanging over relations with its regional neighbours. But for Iran’s leadership, the war is existential. Today matters, this week and next matter, but next year will have to look after itself. If bad relations are a price to pay for surviving, so be it. And it is escalating in this way that has given Iran the initiative in this war because it is making (almost) everybody else pay a price.

If US ground forces are to be used – against Kharg Island where a lot of Iran’s oil industry is located, for example, as is being widely discussed in the news media – the best way to understand the objective is that it will be an effort to regain the initiative so as to be able to set the terms for ending the war.

But so far, there is no clear pathway out of this war that does not leave Iran’s rulers in control of the Strait of Hormuz and in possession of roughly 440 kg of uranium enriched to 60% (short of weapons grade but well on the way). It will not end simply because Trump says so or because he no longer cares about the uranium. It is, of course, true that the USA and Israel, together or separately, can decide to stop attacking. But the regime will be unchanged, it will have the uranium and it will have the Strait of Hormuz.

It seems like Trump realises this. Like any four-year-old teenager, having got into a mess of his own making, he is casting around for somebody else to get him out of it and solve the many problems he has created, and then insulting those who won’t. It is an extraordinary spectacle.

The Strait of Hormuz

Its minimum width is 24 miles (39 kilometres). In that part of the strait, each sea lane is 2 miles wide with a “median” between them of the same width. Some 20 to 25 per cent of the liquefied natural gas and oil that the world uses passes through it. To do so, the tankers (and all other shipping going that way, of course) must go through the territorial waters of both Iran and Oman.

None of that oil or gas goes to Israel or the USA. The USA is the world’s largest producer of natural gas and oil and a net energy exporter. Israel gets most of its crude oil from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, with smaller amounts from Brazil, Gabon and Nigeria. Israel is also an exporter of natural gas (not in liquid form). As world prices rise, it will pay more for its oil and earn more from its gas. The net effect is probably negative but not by too much.

None of this means Israel and the USA and their citizens have no stake in the passage of gas and oil through the Strait of Hormuz being interrupted. Rising energy prices will affect them and so will the ensuing increase in the cost of just about everything. But it does probably mean that the leaders those countries are more relaxed about disruption of sea traffic through the Gulf than almost everybody else.

For the rest of the world, the problem is not that Iran has closed the Strait of Hormuz or is blockading it. It hasn’t and isn’t despite the sloppy way in which most of the news media report it. Rather, Iran is seeking to control the Strait. That provides political leverage, strategic dominance, and income because it is charging a fee for safe passage. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), which always seems to have an eye out for profit as well as political control within Iran, may well want to prolong this toll system after the war, just like Egypt charges a fee for use of the Suez Canal. Watch out for the Houthis in Yemen trying the same with the Bab-el Mandeb between Yemen and Djibouti, another major global choke point for maritime traffic and trade.

Geography and the modern world’s dependence on fossil fuel give Iran and the IRGC this advantage. Short of an unfeasible ground war and an equally unfeasible total occupation of Iran, it will take careful diplomacy to secure safe passage of shipping. That will be fairly straightforward for some countries, China foremost among them. It will be far more complicated for the USA’s traditional allies, especially with the American president mocking and snarling from the sidelines.